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We describe efficient protocols for quantum oblivious transfer and for
one-out-of-two quantum oblivious transfer. These protocols, which can be
implemented with present technology, are secure against general attacks as
long as the cheater can not store the bit for an arbitrarily long period of
time.
1Present and permanent address: Microelectronics Research Laboratories, NEC Cor-
poration, 1120 Shimokuzawa, Sagamihara, Kanagawa 229 Japan. Correspondence con-
cerning this manuscript should be sent to this address.
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In 1970, Wiesner [1] wrote a highly innovative paper about quantum cryp-
tography [2], [3]. In his paper, he also introduced the concept ofMultiplexing,
which was later rediscovered by Rabin, [4] and is now usually called Oblivious
Transfer (OT). Let us briefly describe the OT protocol:
1 - Alice knows one bit λ, where λ is either 1 or −1 [5].
2 - Bob obtains bit λ from Alice with probability 0.5.
3 - Bob knows whether or not he obtained bit λ.
4 - Alice does not learn whether or not Bob obtained bit λ.
In this letter, we propose a very efficient protocol for quantum oblivi-
ous transfer which is secure even against cheaters with unlimited computing
power, if we assume that Bob can not store the bit for an arbitrarily long
period of time. It is worth noting that none of the known non-quantum pro-
tocols for oblivious transfer are perfectly secure; they all allow one among
Alice or Bob to cheat without risk of detection if he or she can break some
unproved cryptographic assumptions.
Before proceeding, it is useful to review some elementary features of quan-
tum mechanics. We consider an unstable source emitting pairs of entangled
Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen (EPR) [8] particles. We take the z axis along the
direction of the flight of the particles, and the x and the y axes along any
two directions perpendicular to the z axis. For a pair of particles in the EPR
state | φ〉 = 1√
2
(|↑↑〉+ |↓↓〉), the expected value of the product of the spin
of the particles along two arbitrary axes ~a and ~b in the xy plane is [9]
〈φ | σa
1
σb
2
| φ〉 = cos (θa + θb) , (1)
where σa
1
is the spin of the first particle along axis ~a, σb
2
is the spin of the
second particle along axis~b, and θa (θb) is the angle between axis ~a
(
~b
)
and the
x axis. Thus the spin of the first particle along the x axis, mx
1
, is perfectly
correlated with the spin of the second particle along the same axis, i.e.,
mx
1
mx
2
= 1. However, the spin of the first particle along the y axis is perfectly
anticorrelated with the spin of the second particle along the same axis, i.e,
m
y
1m
y
2 = −1. Similarly for EPR states [10]
|φ′〉 = 1√
2
(|↑↑〉− |↓↓〉) , 〈φ′ | σa
1
σb
2
| φ′〉 = − cos (θa + θb) ,
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|↑↓〉+ |↓↑〉) , 〈ψ | σa
1
σb
2
| ψ〉 = cos (θa − θb) ,
|ψ′〉 = 1√
2
(|↑↓〉− |↓↑〉) , 〈ψ′ | σa
1
σb
2
| ψ′〉 = − cos (θa − θb) ,
|α〉 = 1√
2
(|↑↑〉+ i |↓↓〉) , 〈α | σa
1
σb
2
| α〉 = sin (θa + θb) , (2)
2
|α′〉 = 1√
2
(|↑↑〉 − i |↓↓〉) , 〈α′ | σa
1
σb
2
| α′〉 = − sin (θa + θb) ,
|β〉 = 1√
2
(|↑↓〉+ i |↓↑〉) , 〈β | σa
1
σb
2
| β〉 = sin (θa − θb) ,
|β ′〉 = 1√
2
(|↑↓〉 − i |↓↑〉) , 〈β ′ | σa
1
σb
2
| β ′〉 = − sin (θa − θb) .
With the above in mind, we now proceed to describe the following pro-
tocol:
(1) Alice and Bob agree that the bit λ is encoded in the product of the spin
of the first and the second particles along the x axis (mx
1
mx
2
or −mx
1
mx
2
),
or the spin of the first and the second particles along the y axis (my1m
y
2 or
−my1my2), or the spin of the first particle along the y axis and the spin of
the second particle along the x axis (my1m
x
2
or −my1mx2), or the spin of the
first particle along the −x axis and the spin of the second particle along
the y axis ( m−x1 m
y
2 or −m−x1 my2). They also agree on a set A defined as
A = {mx
1
mx
2
, m
y
1m
y
2}, and on a set B defined as B = {my1mx2 , m−x1 my2}.
(2) Alice encodes the bit to be obliviously transferred in mx
1
mx
2
, or −mx
1
mx
2
,
or my1m
y
2, or −my1my2, or my1mx2 , or −my1mx2 , or m−x1 my2, or −m−x1 my2, cho-
sen randomly by her. She randomly chooses an appropriate state (as shown
below, there are two appropriate states for any of her choices). She then
prepares a pair of particles in that state and sends both particles to Bob.
(3) Bob measures randomly either mx
1
mx
2
or my1m
y
2, or m
y
1m
x
2
, or m−x1 m
y
2.
(4) Alice asks Bob if his measurements have been successful. If he says no,
then she goes to step 2. If he says yes, then she considers the following two
cases:
(I) Alice asks Bob if his measurement belongs to set A. If he says no, then
she goes to (II). If he says yes (but of course he does not tell her along which
axes he performed his measurements), and if she has chosen one of the four
state |α〉, or |α′〉, or | β〉, or | β ′〉, then she tells him that the protocol has
not been successful, and she goes to step (2). But if she has chosen one of
the four states |φ〉, or |φ′〉, or |ψ〉, or |ψ′〉, then she tells him only one of the
following four alternatives:
(i) λ is encoded in mx
1
mx
2
,
(ii) λ is encoded in −mx
1
mx
2
,
(iii) λ is encoded in my1m
y
2,
(iv) λ is encoded in −my1my2.
(II) Alice asks Bob if his measurement belongs to set B. If he says yes, and
if she has chosen one of the four state |φ〉, or |φ′〉, or |ψ〉, or |ψ′〉, then she
tells him the protocol has not been successful, and she goes to step (2). But
if she has chosen one of the four states |α〉, or |α′〉, or |β〉, or |β ′〉, then she
tells him only one of the following four alternatives:
3
(i) λ is encoded in my1m
x
2
,
(ii) λ is encoded in −my1mx2 ,
(iii) λ is encoded in m−x1 m
y
2,
(iv) λ is encoded in −m−x1 my2.
Theorem: Assuming that Bob can not store the bit until step 4 (when
Alice asks him whether his measurement belongs to set A or B), the above
oblivious transfer protocol is secure even against cheater with unlimited com-
puting power.
Proof: First we consider Alice’s strategy. We assume that Alice has cho-
sen one of the four state |φ〉, or |φ′〉, or |ψ〉, or |ψ′〉, and Bob’s measurement
belongs to set A, i.e., he has measured mx
1
mx
2
ormy1m
y
2. Alice should consider
the following four cases:
(1) First assume λ = 1(−1), and Alice decides to encode λ inmx
1
mx
2
(−mx
1
mx
2
).
In this case, Alice should choose either | φ〉 or | ψ〉, since for both of these
states mx
1
mx
2
= 1. If Bob measures the spin of the two particles along the
x-axis, then he learns the value of λ. However, if he measures the spins of
the particles along the y-axis, then he does not learn any information about
λ, since 〈φ | σy1σy2 | φ〉 = −1, but 〈ψ | σy1σy2 | ψ〉 = 1.
(2) Next assume λ = −1(1), and Alice decides to encode λ inmx
1
mx
2
(−mx
1
mx
2
).
In this case, Alice should choose either | φ′〉 or |ψ′〉, since for both of these
states mx
1
mx
2
= −1. If Bob measures the spin of the two particles along the
x-axis, then he learns the value of λ. However, if he measures the spins of
the particles along the y-axis, then he does not learn any information about
λ, since 〈φ′ | σy1σy2 | φ′〉 = 1, but 〈ψ′ | σy1σy2 | ψ′〉 = −1.
(3) Next assume λ = 1(−1), and Alice decides to encode λ inmy1my2 (−my1my2).
In this case, Alice should choose either | φ′〉 or | ψ〉, since for both of these
states my1m
y
2 = 1 If Bob measures the spin of both particles along the y-axis,
then he learns the value of λ. However, if he measures the spins of the par-
ticles along the x-axis, then does not learn any information about the value
of λ, since 〈φ′ | σx
1
σx
2
| φ′〉 = −1, but 〈ψ | σx
1
σx
2
| ψ〉 = 1.
(4) Finally assume λ = −1(1), and Alice decides to encode λ inmy1my2 (−my1my2).
In this case, Alice should choose either | φ〉 or | ψ′〉, since for both of these
states my1m
y
2 = −1 If Bob measures the spin of both particles along the y-
axis, then he learns the value of λ. However, if he measures the spins of the
particles along the x-axis, then does not learn any information about the
value of λ, since 〈φ | σx
1
σx
2
| φ〉 = 1, but 〈ψ′ | σx
1
σx
2
| ψ′〉 = −1.
We now consider Bob’s strategy. If Bob is honest, then the oblivious
transfer protocol can succeed without any difficulty (see above). Consider
now a cheating Bob who measures the spin of the first particle along axis
~a and measures the spin of the second particle along axis ~b, i.e., ma
1
mb
2
.
Assume (without loss of generality) that Bob obtains ma
1
mb
2
= 1. Bob then
asks the following question: Given that ma
1
mb
2
= 1, what is the probability
4
that mx
1
mx
2
= 1, i.e., what is p
(
mx
1
mx
2
= 1 | ma
1
mb
2
= 1
)
? To answer this
question, he notes that only states |φ〉 and |ψ〉 can contribute to mx
1
mx
2
= 1.
Thus
p
(
mx
1
mx
2
= 1 | ma
1
mb
2
= 1
)
= p
(
|φ〉 | ma
1
mb
2
= 1
)
+ p
(
|ψ〉 | ma
1
mb
2
= 1
)
. (3)
To calculate p
(
|φ〉 | ma
1
mb
2
= 1
)
, note that
p
(
|φ〉 , ma
1
mb
2
= 1
)
= p (|φ〉) p
(
ma
1
mb
2
= 1 | |φ〉
)
,
= p
(
ma
1
mb
2
= 1
)
p
(
|φ〉 | ma
1
mb
2
= 1
)
. (4)
But
p (|φ〉) = 1
4
, (5)
p
(
ma
1
mb
2
= 1
)
=
1
2
, (6)
p
(
ma
1
mb
2
= 1 | |φ〉
)
= cos2
(
θa + θb
2
)
, (7)
where (5) follows from the fact that Alice chooses any state with probability
1
4, (6) follows from the symmetry of the problem, and (7) follows from the
standard rules of quantum mechanics.
Substituting the above formulas in Eq. (4), we obtain
p
(
|φ〉 | ma
1
mb
2
= 1
)
=
1
2
cos2
(
θa + θb
2
)
. (8)
Similar argument shows that
p
(
|ψ〉 | ma
1
mb
2
= 1
)
=
1
2
cos2
(
θa − θb
2
)
. (9)
Thus
p
(
mx
1
mx
2
= 1 | ma
1
mb
2
= 1
)
=
1
2
cos2
(
θa + θb
2
)
+
1
2
cos2
(
θa − θb
2
)
. (10)
Bob now asks the following question: Given that ma
1
mb
2
= 1, what is the
probability that my1m
y
2 = 1, i.e., what is p
(
m
y
1m
y
2 = 1 | ma1mb2 = 1
)
? To
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answer this question, he notes that only states |φ′〉 and |ψ〉 can contribute
to my1m
y
2 = 1. Thus
p
(
m
y
1m
y
2 = 1 | ma1mb2 = 1
)
= p
(
| φ′〉 | ma
1
mb
2
= 1
)
+ p
(
| ψ〉 | ma
1
mb
2
= 1
)
.(11)
Similar argument as before shows that
p
(
m
y
1m
y
2 = 1 | ma1mb2 = 1
)
=
1
2
sin2
(
θa + θb
2
)
+
1
2
cos2
(
θa − θb
2
)
. (12)
Now the probability that Bob learns the value of λ is 12 [ p (m
y
1m
y
2 = 1 |
ma
1
mb
2
= 1)+ p (mx
1
mx
2
= 1 | ma
1
mb
2
= 1) ]. From Eqs. (12) and (14), we have
1
2
[
p
(
m
y
1m
y
2 = 1 | ma1mb2 = 1
)
+ p
(
mx
1
mx
2
= 1 | ma
1
mb
2
= 1
)]
=
1
4
+
1
2
cos2
(
θa − θb
2
)
. (13)
Note that the maximum value of the RHS of (13) is 34. Thus the best
strategy for Bob is to measure the spins of both particles either along the
same axis. In particular, if Bob does not cheat and measures the spins of
both particles either along the x-axis or along the y-axis, then he obtains
maximum information about the value of the OT bit λ.
Having demonstrated that if Alice chooses one of the four states | φ〉,
or | φ′〉, or | ψ〉, or | ψ′〉, and if Bob’s measurement belongs to set A, then
the OT protocol can be implemented successfully, we now consider the other
alternative. We assume that Alice has chosen one of the four state |α〉, or
|α′〉, or | β〉, or | β ′〉, and Bob’s measurement belongs to set B, i.e., he has
measured my1m
x
2
, or m−x1 m
y
2. Again Alice should consider the following four
cases:
(1) First assume λ = 1(−1), and Alice encodes λ in my1mx2 (−my1mx2). In this
case, Alice should choose either | α〉 or | β〉, since for both of these states
m
y
1m
x
2
= 1. If Bob measures the spin of the first particle along the y axis,
and spin of the second particle along the x axis, then he learns the value of
λ. However, if he measures the spins of the first particle along the −x axis,
and the spin of the second particle along y axis, then he does not learn any
information about λ, since 〈α | σ−x1 σy2 | α〉 = −1, but 〈β | σ−x1 σy2 | β〉 = 1.
(2) Next assume λ = −1(1), and Alice encodes λ in my1mx2 (−my1mx2). In this
case, Alice should choose either | α′〉 or | β ′〉, since for both of these states
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m
y
1m
x
2
= −1. If Bob measures the spin of the first particle along the y axis,
and spin of the second particle along the x axis, then he learns the value of
λ. However, if he measures the spins of the first particle along the −x axis,
and the spin of the second particle along y axis, then he does not learn any
information about λ, since 〈α′ | σ−x1 σy2 | α′〉 = 1, but 〈β ′ | σ−x1 σy2 | β ′〉 = −1.
(3) Next assume λ = 1(−1), and Alice encodes λ in m−x1 my2
(
−m−x1 my2
)
. In
this case, Alice should choose either | α′〉 or | β〉, since for both of these
states m−x1 m
y
2 = 1 If Bob measures the spin of the first particle along -x axis
and spin of the second particle along the y-axis, then he learns the value
of λ. However, if he measures the spin of of the first particle along the y
axis and spin of the second particle along the x axis, then he does not learn
any information about the value of λ, since 〈α′ | σy1σx2 | α′〉 = −1, but
〈β | σy1σx2 | β〉 = 1.
(4) Finally assume λ = −1(1), and Alice encodes λ in m−x1 my2
(
−m−x1 my2
)
.
In this case, Alice should choose either | α〉 or | β ′〉, since for both of these
states m−x1 m
y
2 = −1 If Bob measures the spin of both particles along the
y-axis, then he learns the value of λ. However, if he measures the spin of of
the first particle along the y axis and spin of the second particle along the
x axis, then he does not learn any information about the value of λ, since
〈α | σy1σx2 | α〉 = −1, but 〈β ′ | σy1σx2 | β ′〉 = 1.
If Bob is honest, then the OT protocol can succeed without any difficulty
(see above). However, if Bob is dishonest, the same argument as before shows
that he does not gain any additional information by cheating. Thus the OT
protocol is secure even against cheaters with unlimited computing power.
There is another flavor of OT which is called one-out-of-two oblivious
transfer. The goal of this protocol is:
1 - Alice has two bits λ1 and λ2 where λ1 (or λ2) is either 1 or −1.
2 - Bob chooses to obtain either bit λ1 or λ2.
3 - Bob knows whether or not he has obtained the bit.
4 - Alice does not learn which bit Bob has chosen.
Less formally, Alice has two bits. Bob can get only one of them, and Alice
does not learn which bit Bob obtained.
This protocol can be implemented by
(1) Alice and Bob agree that λ1 is encoded in m
x
1
mx
2
, or −mx
1
mx
2
, or my1m
y
2,
or −my1my2, and λ2 is encoded in my1mx2 , or −my1mx2 , or m−x1 my2, or −m−x1 my2.
They also agree on a set A defined as A = {mx
1
mx
2
, m
y
1m
y
2}, and on a set B
defined as B = {my1mx2 , m−x1 my2}.
(2) Alice encodes λ1 in m
x
1
mx
2
, or −mx
1
mx
2
, or my1m
x
2
, or −my1mx2 , and λ2 in
m
y
1m
y
2, or −my1my2, or m−x1 my2, or −m−x1 my2, chosen randomly by her. She
randomly chooses an appropriate state (as shown below, there are two ap-
propriate states for any of her choices). She then prepares a pair of particles
in that state and sends both particles to Bob.
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(3) Bob measures randomly either mx
1
mx
2
or my1m
y
2, or m
y
1m
x
2
, or m−x1 m
y
2.
(4) Alice asks Bob if his measurements have been successful. If he says no,
then she goes to step 2. If he says yes, then she considers the following two
cases:
(I) Alice asks Bob if his measurement belongs to set A. If he says no, then
Alice goes to step (II). If he says yes (but of course he does not tell her along
which axes he performed his measurements), and if she has chosen one of the
four state |α〉, or |α′〉, or |β〉, or |β ′〉, then she tells him that the protocol
has not been successful, and she goes to step (2). But if Alice has chosen
one of the four states |φ〉, or |φ′〉, or |ψ〉, or |ψ′〉, then she tells him that λ1
is encoded in mx
1
mx
2
or −mx
1
mx
2
, and λ2 is encoded in m
y
1m
y
2 or −my1my2.
(II) Alice asks Bob if his measurement belongs to set B. If he says yes, and
if she has chosen one of the four state |φ〉, or |φ′〉, or |ψ〉, or |ψ′〉, then she
tells him that the protocol has not been successful, and she goes to step (2).
But if Alice has chosen one of the four states | α〉, or | α′〉, or | β〉, or | β ′〉,
then she tells him that λ1 is encoded in m
y
1m
x
2
or −my1mx2 , and λ2 is encoded
in m−x1 m
y
2 or −m−x1 my2.
Theorem: Assuming that Bob can not store the bit until step 4 (when
Alice asks him whether his measurement belongs to set A or B), the above
one-out-of-two oblivious transfer protocol is secure against cheater with un-
limited computing power.
Proof: First Assume that Bob performed his measurement in set A, and
Alice has chosen one of the four states |φ〉, or |φ′〉, or |ψ〉, or |ψ′〉, (similar
argument also applies if Alice has chosen one of the four states |α〉, or |α′〉,
or |β〉, or |β ′〉). She should consider the following four cases:
(i) First assume λ1 = 1, λ2 = 1, and Alice decides to encode λ1 in m
x
1
mx
2
,
and λ2 in m
y
1m
y
2, or λ1 = −1, λ2 = −1, and Alice decides to encode λ1 in
−mx
1
mx
2
, and λ2 in −my1my2 In this case, Alice should choose state |ψ〉, since
for this state mx
1
mx
2
= 1, and my1m
y
2 = 1.
(ii) Next assume λ1 = 1, λ2 = −1, and Alice decides to encode λ1 in mx1mx2 ,
and λ2 in m
y
1m
y
2, or λ1 = −1, λ2 = 1, and Alice decides to encode λ1 in
−mx
1
mx
2
, and λ2 in −my1my2. In this case, Alice should choose state |φ〉, since
for this state mx
1
mx
2
= 1, and my1m
y
2 = −1.
(iii) Next assume λ1 = −1, λ2 = 1, and Alice decides to encode λ1 in mx1mx2 ,
and λ2 in m
y
1m
y
2, or λ1 = 1, λ2 = −1, and Alice decides to encode λ1 in
−mx
1
mx
2
, and λ2 in −my1my2. In this case, Alice should choose state | φ′〉,
since for this state mx
1
mx
2
= −1, and my1my2 = 1.
(iv) Finally assume λ1 = −1, λ2 = −1, and Alice decides to encode λ1 in
mx
1
mx
2
, and λ2 in m
y
1m
y
2, or λ1 = 1, λ2 = 1, and Alice decides to encode λ1
in −mx
1
mx
2
, and λ2 in −my1my2. In this case, Alice should choose state |ψ′〉,
since for this state mx
1
mx
2
= −1, and my1my2 = −1.
The same argument that was used for quantum OT can be used to prove
8
that Bob does not gain any additional information by setting his polarizer
at other angles. Thus the one-out-of-two OT protocol is secure even against
cheaters with unlimited computing power.
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